Bechorot Daf 18 (בכורות דף י״ח)
Daf: 18 | Amudim: 18a – 18b | Date: Loading...
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (18a)
Segment 1
TYPE: דחייה
The rejection completed: Rabbi Eliezer follows Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, so he tells us nothing about the Rabbis
Hebrew/Aramaic:
סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, דְּאָמַר: אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן בִּידֵי אָדָם.
English Translation:
holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: It is possible for two matters that are in the hands of Heaven to coincide precisely, and all the more so matters that are in human hands. Consequently, one cannot cite Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in order to determine the opinion of the Rabbis.
קלאוד על הדף:
This finishes the sentence that broke off at the end of 17b. Rabbi Eliezer’s two heifers do show that exact measurement is possible, but only because he agrees with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili that even natural events can coincide exactly. The question on 17b was what the Rabbis think about human measurement, and a ruling from Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s camp cannot answer it.
Key Terms:
- סָבַר לַהּ כְּ = he holds in accordance with
- אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם = it is possible to be exact
Segment 2
TYPE: ראיה
Perhaps it is a dispute of tannaim: the first tanna says no heifer is brought at all
Hebrew/Aramaic:
נֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: נִמְצָא מְכוָּּון בֵּין שְׁתֵּי עֲיָירוֹת — לֹא הָיוּ עוֹרְפִין, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: שְׁתֵּיהֶן מְבִיאוֹת שְׁתֵּי עֲגָלוֹת. מַאי לָאו בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם?
English Translation:
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is subject to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: If the corpse of a slain person was found precisely between two towns, they would not break the heifer’s neck at all. Rabbi Eliezer says: The two towns bring two heifers between them. What, is it not correct to say that they disagree with regard to this matter, in that the first tanna holds that it is impossible for two matters to coincide precisely and Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is possible for two matters to coincide precisely?
קלאוד על הדף:
A baraita records a third view. When the corpse lies exactly between two towns, the first tanna says no heifer’s neck is broken, while Rabbi Eliezer requires two. The Gemara proposes that they disagree about precision. The first tanna would hold that exact equidistance is impossible, and Rabbi Eliezer that it is possible.
Key Terms:
- נֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי = let us say it is a dispute of tannaim
- לֹא הָיוּ עוֹרְפִין = they would not break [the heifer’s] neck
- תַּנָּא קַמָּא = the first tanna — the anonymous opening view of a mishna or baraita
Segment 3
TYPE: דחייה
If the first tanna denied precision, he would require one heifer brought jointly, not none
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְתִיסְבְּרַאּ? אִי קָסָבַר תַּנָּא קַמָּא אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם, אַמַּאי לֹא הָיוּ עוֹרְפִים? יָבִיאוּ עֶגְלָה אַחַת בְּשׁוּתָּפוּת, וְיִתְּנוּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: And how can you understand that to be the dispute? If the first tanna holds that it is impossible for two matters to coincide precisely, why does he claim that they would not break the heifer’s neck? Let them bring one heifer in partnership and stipulate that it is brought for the town that is actually nearest.
קלאוד על הדף:
The proposal does not work. If exactness were impossible, one of the towns really is nearer, and the natural solution is a single heifer owned by both towns with a stipulation. It would be brought on behalf of whichever town is in fact the closer. A ruling that no heifer is brought at all cannot come from doubt about measurement.
Key Terms:
- וְתִיסְבְּרַאּ = and can you understand it so? — a rhetorical rejection
- בְּשׁוּתָּפוּת = in partnership — jointly owned
- וְיִתְּנוּ = and they stipulate — make a condition about whose it is
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
Rather, all these tannaim accept precision; they dispute whether ‘the nearest’ can mean two towns
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, לְהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם, וְהָכָא בִּ״קְרוֹבָה״ וְלֹא קְרוֹבוֹת קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: ״קְרוֹבָה״ וְלֹא קְרוֹבוֹת, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: ״קְרוֹבָה״ וַאֲפִילּוּ קְרוֹבוֹת.
English Translation:
Rather, with regard to these tanna’im, everyone agrees that it is possible for two matters to coincide precisely. And here they disagree over whether the singular form kerova in the phrase “the town which is nearest [kerova]” indicates that only the nearest town brings a heifer, and not the many nearest [kerovot] towns; as the first tanna holds that it is derived from the term “kerova” that only the nearest town brings a heifer, and not multiple kerovot; and Rabbi Eliezer holds that although the verse states “kerova,” nevertheless this includes even multiple towns that are kerovot.
קלאוד על הדף:
Both tannaim of this baraita agree that exact equidistance is possible, and they disagree about the verse. The first tanna reads the singular ‘kerova’ (the nearest town) strictly: when two towns are equally near, neither is ‘the nearest’, so no heifer is brought. Rabbi Eliezer reads ‘kerova’ as including two equally near towns, so each brings one.
Key Terms:
- קְרוֹבָה = ‘the nearest’ — the singular in Devarim 21:3
- וְלֹא קְרוֹבוֹת = and not [two or more] nearest ones
- כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא = everyone — all the disputants agree
Segment 5
TYPE: ברייתא
What is the conclusion? Rav Amram’s baraita: the Rabbis require one heifer, jointly, with a stipulation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַב עַמְרָם: תָּנָא נִמְצָא מְכוָּּון בֵּין שְׁתֵּי עֲיָירוֹת, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: שְׁתֵּיהֶן מְבִיאוֹת שְׁתֵּי עֲגָלוֹת, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יָבִיאוּ עֶגְלָה אַחַת בְּשׁוּתָּפוּת וְיַתְנוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about the Rabbis’ opinion with regard to whether matters in human hands can coincide precisely? Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin says that Rav Amram says: The Sages taught in a baraita: If the slain person was found precisely between two towns, Rabbi Eliezer says: The two towns bring two heifers between them; and the Rabbis say: They bring one heifer in partnership and stipulate that it is brought for the town that is nearest.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara asks for the final word on the Rabbis’ view. Rav Chiyya bar Avin cites Rav Amram quoting a baraita. In it, against Rabbi Eliezer’s two heifers, the Rabbis rule that the two towns bring one heifer in partnership and stipulate that it belongs to the town that is actually nearer. This is exactly the ruling the Gemara said a denier of precision would give.
Key Terms:
- מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ = what is the conclusion on it?
- רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין = Rav Chiyya bar Avin — Babylonian amora
- רַב עַמְרָם = Rav Amram — Babylonian amora, a student of Rav
Segment 6
TYPE: מסקנא
Therefore the Rabbis hold that exactness is impossible, even in human hands — conclusively proven
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַאי קָסָבְרִי רַבָּנַן? אִי קָסָבְרִי רַבָּנַן דְּאֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם, וּקְרוֹבָה — וַאֲפִילּוּ קְרוֹבוֹת, לַיְיתֵי תַּרְתֵּי! וְאִי ״קְרוֹבָה״ וְלֹא קְרוֹבוֹת, אֲפִילּוּ חֲדָא לָא לַיְיתֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ קָסָבְרִי רַבָּנַן: אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם, וַאֲפִילּוּ בִּידֵי אָדָם. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.
English Translation:
What do the Rabbis hold in this regard? If the Rabbis hold that is possible for two matters that are in human hands to coincide precisely, and the singular “kerova” includes even multiple towns, kerovot, then they should bring two heifers. And if they hold that “kerova” indicates: But not kerovot, then they should not bring even one heifer. Rather, must one not conclude from it that the Rabbis hold: It is impossible for two matters to coincide precisely, and this is true even with regard to matters that are in human hands? Indeed, conclude from it that this is so.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara closes off the alternatives. If the Rabbis held precision possible and ‘kerova’ to include two towns, they would require two heifers. If they held precision possible and ‘kerova’ to exclude two, they would require none. Only one heifer with a stipulation fits, so they must hold that no human measurement can establish exact equidistance. That answers the question the school of Rabbi Yannai raised on 17b.
Key Terms:
- שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ = conclude from it — the proof is accepted
- לַיְיתֵי תַּרְתֵּי = let them bring two
- אֲפִילּוּ חֲדָא לָא לַיְיתֵי = they should not bring even one
Segment 7
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Tarfon’s reason: the healthier twin emerged first
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶת הַיָּפֶה. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן? קָא סָבַר: הָהוּא דְּבָרִיא נָפֵק בְּרֵישָׁא.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches that in the case of a ewe that gave birth for the first time to two male offspring whose heads emerged as one, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Tarfon? He holds that it is presumed that the healthier and better of the two emerged first, and therefore it belongs to the priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara returns to the twin-males mishna. Rabbi Tarfon lets the kohen choose the better lamb because he assumes the stronger animal is born first. That makes the better twin the firstborn, and so it belongs to the kohen.
Key Terms:
- בָּרִיא = healthy, robust
- נָפֵק בְּרֵישָׁא = came out first
- בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶת הַיָּפֶה = chooses the better one for himself
Segment 8
TYPE: מימרא וקושיא
Rabbi Yochanan: under Rabbi Akiva the kohen takes the leaner — Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba: doesn’t ‘meshamnin’ mean they split?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: ״מְשַׁמְּנִין״ כּוּ׳. אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַכֹּהֵן נוֹטֵל כְּחוּשָׁה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וְהָא אֲנַן ״מְשַׁמְּנִין בֵּינֵיהֶן״ תְּנַן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: עַד דַּאֲכַלְתְּ כַּפְנְיָיתָא בְּבָבֶל, תַּרְגֵּימְנָא מִסֵּיפָא.
English Translation:
The mishna further teaches that Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: According to Rabbi Akiva, the priest takes the leaner of the two. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: But didn’t we learn that they assess the value of the offspring between them, which indicates that the priest and owner divide their value? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: While you were eating dates in Babylonia, we in Eretz Yisrael explained it based on the latter clause in the mishna.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Yochanan explains Rabbi Akiva’s ‘meshamnin beineihen’ as meaning that the kohen takes the lean one. Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba objects that the phrase sounds like an assessment of value that is then divided between them. Rabbi Yochanan’s retort is famous: while you were eating dates in Babylonia, we in Eretz Yisrael had already explained this from the mishna’s later clause.
Key Terms:
- כְּחוּשָׁה = the lean one
- כַּפְנְיָיתָא = dates — here, unripe or poor dates, the food of Babylonia
- תַּרְגֵּימְנָא מִסֵּיפָא = we explained it from the latter clause
- רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא = Rabbi Chiyya bar Abba — Babylonian-born amora who studied in Eretz Yisrael under Rabbi Yochanan
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
Proof from the later clause: when one dies Rabbi Akiva does not split, so ‘meshamnin’ means the extra fat is in doubt
Hebrew/Aramaic:
דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: מֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶן, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: יַחְלוֹקוּ, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ ״מְשַׁמְּנִין בֵּינֵיהֶן״ דְּכִי הֲדָדֵי פְּלִיגִי, הָכִי נָמֵי (לִיפַּלְגִי) [לִיפְלוֹג] גַּבֵּי הֲדָדֵי! אֶלָּא מַאי ״מְשַׁמְּנִין״ — שׁוֹמֶן יְהֵא בֵּינֵיהֶן, דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ לְכֹהֵן: אַיְיתִי רְאָיָה דִּבְכוֹר הוּא וּשְׁקֹיל.
English Translation:
As the latter clause teaches: If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb, and Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. And if it enters your mind that when Rabbi Akiva said that they assess the value between them he meant that they divide the value between them, then in the latter clause too, let them divide the value of the remaining offspring between them instead of leaving it with the owner. Rather, what does: They assess [meshammenin] the value between them, mean? It means that the additional fat [shumman] of the better twin will be the subject of dispute between them, as the owner says to the priest: Bring a proof that the better one is the firstborn, and take it.
קלאוד על הדף:
In the case where one twin died, Rabbi Akiva does not divide the survivor. He leaves it with the owner, because the claimant must bring proof. Had ‘meshamnin’ meant dividing value, he would have divided there as well. So the word refers to the shuman, the extra fat of the better twin. That surplus is in doubt, the owner may say ‘prove it is the firstborn and take it’, and the kohen is left with the leaner lamb.
Key Terms:
- שׁוֹמֶן = fat — here, the surplus value of the better twin
- אַיְיתִי רְאָיָה וּשְׁקֹיל = bring proof and take it
- כִּי הֲדָדֵי = equally — divided between them
- סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ = if it should enter your mind
Segment 10
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Meir obligates the second twin in matanot: the kohen comes at him ‘from two sides’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהַשֵּׁנִי יִרְעֶה עַד שֶׁיִּסְתָּאֵב, וְחַיָּיב בְּמַתָּנוֹת, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי פּוֹטֵר. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הוֹאִיל וְכֹהֵן בָּא עָלָיו מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין, דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: אִי בְּכוֹר הוּא — כּוּלֵּיהּ דִּידִי הוּא, אִי לָא בְּכוֹר הוּא — הַב לִי מַתָּנוֹת מִינֵּיהּ.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches: And the second lamb that remains in the possession of the owner must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point he may slaughter and eat it, and he is obligated to have the gifts of the priesthood, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, taken from it; and Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving those gifts. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir, whose opinion is the ruling cited first in the mishna? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The owner is obligated since the priest comes upon him from two sides, i.e., by force of two complementary claims, as the priest says to him: If the second lamb is in fact the firstborn, it is mine in its entirety, and if it is not the firstborn, at least give me the priestly gifts from it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The anonymous view obliging the owner to give the priestly gifts is Rabbi Meir’s. Rabbi Yochanan explains that the kohen has a claim whichever way the doubt falls. If this lamb is the firstborn, it belongs to him entirely. If it is not, it is an ordinary animal and he is owed its foreleg, jaw and maw. Either way the kohen is owed something, so the owner cannot say to him ‘prove it’.
Key Terms:
- בָּא עָלָיו מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין = comes upon him from two sides — has a claim either way
- מַתָּנוֹת = the priestly gifts — the foreleg, jaw and maw (Devarim 18:3)
- הַב לִי = give me
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Rabbi Yosei exempts: the Sages treated the kohen as if he had acquired this lamb and sold it back
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רָבָא: עָשׂוּ שֶׁאֵינוֹ זוֹכֶה כְּזוֹכֶה, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מְטָא לִידֵיהּ כְּמַאן דִּמְטָא לִידֵיהּ, וְזַבְּנֵיהּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל בְּמוּמֵיהּ.
English Translation:
And what is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei, who deems the owner exempt from giving the priestly gifts from the second animal? Rava says: In this particular case, the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal. And therefore, even though the second lamb of the Israelite did not actually enter the priest’s possession, it is considered as though it entered the priest’s possession and he then sold it to the Israelite in its blemished state, in exchange for the lamb he received. The owner can then claim that perhaps it is the firstborn, and he already fulfilled his obligation of giving it to the priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rava explains Rabbi Yosei’s exemption. The kohen has already received one of the twins, and that twin stands ‘in exchange’ for this one. The Sages therefore treat the kohen as though he acquired the second twin too and sold it back to the owner in its blemished state. The owner may then say that if this is the firstborn, he has in effect already given it. A blemished firstborn from a kohen owes no gifts.
Key Terms:
- עָשׂוּ שֶׁאֵינוֹ זוֹכֶה כְּזוֹכֶה = they treated one who did not acquire as one who acquired
- בְּמוּמֵיהּ = in its blemished state
- חֲלִיפִין = replacements — the other twin, which the kohen holds in exchange
- רָבָא = Rava — fourth-generation Babylonian amora, head of the academy at Mechoza
Segment 12
TYPE: מימרא
Rabbi Elazar: all agree that a doubtful firstborn with no replacement in the kohen’s hand owes matanot
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בִּסְפֵק בְּכוֹר, שֶׁאֵין חֲלִיפִין בְּיַד כֹּהֵן, שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּמַתָּנוֹת.
English Translation:
§ Rabbi Elazar says: Everyone concedes in the case of an animal with uncertain firstborn status, the replacement for which is not in the possession of the priest, that it is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it. In other words, in a case where the priest receives neither offspring, e.g., when a male and female are born together, all agree that the owner must give the gifts to the priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
Where the kohen has received nothing in exchange — for example a male and a female born together — the doubtful firstborn owes the priestly gifts according to everyone. Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning depends on the replacement, and here there is none.
Key Terms:
- סְפֵק בְּכוֹר = a doubtful firstborn
- אֵין חֲלִיפִין בְּיַד כֹּהֵן = there is no replacement in the kohen’s hand
- רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר = Rabbi Elazar (ben Pedat) — amora of Eretz Yisrael, a leading student of Rabbi Yochanan
Segment 13
TYPE: קושיא
‘All agree’ must mean Rabbi Yosei — but that is obvious
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הַכֹּל מוֹדִים מַאן? רַבִּי יוֹסֵי? פְּשִׁיטָא! עַד כָּאן לָא קָא פָטַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הָתָם, אֶלָּא דַּחֲלִיפִין בְּיַד כֹּהֵן, דְּעָשׂוּ שֶׁאֵינוֹ זוֹכֶה כְּזוֹכֶה, אֲבָל אֵין חֲלִיפִין בְּיַד כֹּהֵן — לָא!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: When Rabbi Elazar said that everyone concedes, to whom was he referring? Was he referring to Rabbi Yosei? That seems obvious. After all, Rabbi Yosei deemed the owner exempt from giving the gifts only there, where the replacement is in the possession of the priest, as the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal. But if the replacement is not in the possession of the priest, evidently Rabbi Yosei does not rule that one is exempt, as his reasoning does not apply. Why, then, is the statement of Rabbi Elazar necessary?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Meir obligates in any case, so ‘everyone agrees’ must be aimed at Rabbi Yosei. But that seems obvious. Rabbi Yosei exempts only because the kohen holds a replacement, so where he holds none, the exemption has no basis. Why did Rabbi Elazar need to say it?
Key Terms:
- פְּשִׁיטָא = it is obvious
- עַד כָּאן לָא קָא פָטַר = he exempted only up to here — only in that case
Segment 14
TYPE: תירוץ
Lest one think Rabbi Yosei’s real reason is to prevent shearing and work
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּקָסָבַר דְּאִי מְחַיְּיבַתְּ לֵיהּ בְּמַתָּנוֹת — אָתֵי לֵיהּ לִידֵי גִּיזָּה וַעֲבוֹדָה, אַף עַל גַּב דְּאֵין חֲלִיפִין בְּיַד כֹּהֵן, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Elazar’s statement is in fact necessary, lest you say that the reason Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving the gifts is that he holds that if you deem him obligated in the gifts, he will assume that the animal is completely non-sacred and come to use it for shearing and labor. Consequently, even though there is no replacement in the hands of the priest, the Sages ruled that one is exempt from giving the gifts, in order to ensure that he does not violate the prohibition against shearing the animal or using it for labor. Rabbi Elazar therefore teaches us that this is not the halakha, as Rabbi Yosei agrees that one is obligated to give the priestly gifts in such circumstances.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Elazar’s statement is needed. One might have thought Rabbi Yosei’s exemption rests on a different concern. If the owner has to give gifts, as from an ordinary animal, he may come to treat the doubtful firstborn as fully non-sacred and shear it or work it — acts forbidden with a firstborn. That concern would apply even without a replacement. Rabbi Elazar teaches that Rabbi Yosei’s reason is the replacement, so without one he agrees the gifts are owed.
Key Terms:
- מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא = what would you have said — introducing the mistaken assumption
- גִּיזָּה וַעֲבוֹדָה = shearing and labor — both forbidden with a firstborn
- קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן = he teaches us
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא
But the mishna’s later clause already states Rabbi Yosei’s rule: ‘whatever has a replacement in the kohen’s hand’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמִי מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ הָכִי? וְהָתָנֵי סֵיפָא, שֶׁהָיָה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר:
English Translation:
The Gemara objects: And how can you say this? But doesn’t the latter clause of the mishna (18b) teach: As Rabbi Yosei says:
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara objects to the whole explanation. The mishna on 18b explicitly says that Rabbi Yosei exempts ‘whatever has its replacement in the kohen’s hand’. Since the mishna itself gives the replacement as his reason, Rabbi Elazar would seem to add nothing. The quotation carries over onto 18b.
Key Terms:
- וּמִי מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ הָכִי = and can you say this?
- וְהָתָנֵי סֵיפָא = but the latter clause teaches
Amud Bet (18b)
Segment 1
TYPE: קושיא (המשך)
The mishna’s wording: with a replacement — exempt; without one — not
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כֹּל שֶׁחֲלִיפָיו בְּיַד כֹּהֵן פָּטוּר מִן הַמַּתָּנוֹת, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב. חֲלִיפִין בְּיַד כֹּהֵן — אִין, אֵין חֲלִיפִין בְּיַד כֹּהֵן — לָא!
English Translation:
With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of the priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts, and Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. Evidently, in a case where the replacement is in the possession of the priest, yes, Rabbi Yosei rules that the owner is exempt from giving the gifts, but if the replacement is not in the possession of the priest, he is not exempt.
קלאוד על הדף:
The quote from 18a concludes: ‘whatever has its replacement in the kohen’s hand is exempt from the gifts, and Rabbi Meir obligates’. The inference is plain. Rabbi Yosei exempts only where a replacement exists, so Rabbi Elazar’s ‘all agree’ should be unnecessary.
Key Terms:
- כֹּל שֶׁחֲלִיפָיו בְּיַד כֹּהֵן = anything whose replacements are in the kohen’s hand
- אִין = yes
Segment 2
TYPE: תירוץ
Lest one think Rabbi Yosei argued ‘to Rabbi Meir’s own words’
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לִדְבָרָיו דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר קָאָמַר לֵיהּ — לְדִידִי, אֲפִילּוּ אֵין חֲלִיפִין בְּיַד כֹּהֵן, דְּאִי מְחַיְּיבַתְּ לֵיהּ בְּמַתָּנוֹת אָתֵי לֵיהּ לִידֵי גִּיזָּה וַעֲבוֹדָה; לְדִידָךְ, אוֹדִי לִי מִיהָא הֵיכָא דַּחֲלִיפִין בְּיַד כֹּהֵן, דְּעָשׂוּ שֶׁאֵינוֹ זוֹכֶה כְּזוֹכֶה; וְאָמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר: לָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains that even so, Rabbi Elazar’s statement is necessary, lest you say that Rabbi Yosei was not expressing his own opinion but stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir, i.e., he said to him: In my opinion, the Israelite is exempt from giving the priestly gifts even if the replacement is not in the possession of the priest, as, if you deem him obligated in the gifts, he might think that the animal is completely non-sacred and come to use it for shearing and labor. But even according to your reasoning, at least concede to me in a case where the replacement is in the possession of the priest, that the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal. And Rabbi Meir said to Rabbi Yosei: No, I do not concede in that case. Accordingly, Rabbi Elazar is teaching that Rabbi Yosei does, in fact, maintain that the reason for the Israelite’s exemption is that the replacement is in the possession of the priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Elazar is still needed. The mishna’s phrasing could be a debating move. Rabbi Yosei might personally exempt every doubtful firstborn because of the shearing concern, but in argument he tells Rabbi Meir: ‘even by your reasoning, concede at least where the kohen holds a replacement’. Rabbi Meir refuses. Rabbi Elazar teaches that the replacement is Rabbi Yosei’s real reason, and without one he obligates.
Key Terms:
- לִדְבָרָיו דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר = according to Rabbi Meir’s own words — arguing within the opponent’s premises
- לְדִידִי = according to me
- לְדִידָךְ = according to you
- אוֹדִי לִי מִיהָא = at least concede to me
Segment 3
TYPE: מימרא וקושיא
Rav Pappa: all agree a doubtful ma’aser animal is exempt from matanot — but that is obvious for Rabbi Meir
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בִּסְפֵק מַעֲשֵׂר שֶׁפָּטוּר מִן הַמַּתָּנוֹת. ״הַכֹּל מוֹדִים״ — מַאן? רַבִּי מֵאִיר? פְּשִׁיטָא! עַד כָּאן לָא קָמְחַיֵּיב רַבִּי מֵאִיר הָתָם אֶלָּא בִּסְפֵק בְּכוֹר, הוֹאִיל וּבָא עָלָיו כֹּהֵן מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין, אֲבָל סָפֵק מַעֲשֵׂר — לָא.
English Translation:
And Rav Pappa says with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei: Everyone concedes in the case of an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain that its owner is exempt from the mitzva of the priestly gifts. The Gemara asks: When Rav Pappa says that everyone concedes, to whom is he referring? Is he referring to Rabbi Meir? That would seem obvious. After all, Rabbi Meir deemed one obligated to give the gifts only there, in the case of an animal whose status as firstborn is uncertain, since the priest comes upon the Israelite from two sides. But with regard to an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain Rabbi Meir does not rule that one is obligated, as that reasoning does not apply. Why, then, is Rav Pappa’s statement necessary?
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa makes the matching statement from the other side. An animal that may be ma’aser behema (the animal tithe) is exempt from the gifts according to everyone. Here ‘everyone’ must mean Rabbi Meir, and that seems obvious. His reason for obligating was that the kohen comes ‘from two sides’, and with a doubtful tithe the kohen has no claim either way. A tithe animal belongs to its owner, not to the kohen.
Key Terms:
- סְפֵק מַעֲשֵׂר = a doubtful tithe — an animal that may be ma’aser behema
- מַעֲשֵׂר בְּהֵמָה = the animal tithe — every tenth animal, offered and eaten by its owner (Vayikra 27:32)
- רַב פָּפָּא = Rav Pappa — fifth-generation Babylonian amora, a student of Abaye and Rava
Segment 4
TYPE: תירוץ
Lest one think Rabbi Meir obligates so that the law of matanot is not forgotten
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּלֹא תִּשְׁתַּכַּח תּוֹרַת מַתָּנוֹת, אֲפִילּוּ סְפֵק מַעֲשֵׂר נָמֵי? קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains that the statement of Rav Pappa is necessary lest you say that the reason that Rabbi Meir deems him obligated in the gifts is so that the halakhic category of the gifts should not be forgotten; if so, the same would apply even in the case of an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain. Rav Pappa therefore teaches us otherwise.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rav Pappa is needed because Rabbi Meir might have a broader, policy-based reason. He may obligate in doubtful cases so that people do not forget the institution of the gifts, and that concern would reach doubtful tithes too. Rav Pappa teaches that Rabbi Meir does not hold this.
Key Terms:
- דְּלֹא תִּשְׁתַּכַּח תּוֹרַת מַתָּנוֹת = so that the law of the gifts is not forgotten
- אֲפִילּוּ = even
Segment 5
TYPE: קושיא
But the mishna shows the dispute turns on replacements, not on forgetting
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמִי מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ הָכִי? וְהָקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא, שֶׁהָיָה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁחֲלִיפָיו בְּיַד כֹּהֵן — פָּטוּר מִן הַמַּתָּנוֹת, וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And how can you say this? But doesn’t the latter clause teach: As Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of a priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts, and Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. Evidently, the basis for the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei is not whether an obligation is imposed so that the halakhic category of the priestly gifts should not be forgotten, but whether the Sages rendered one who did not acquire the animal like one who acquired the animal, which means that an animal whose replacement is in the priest’s possession is not subject to the mitzva of the gifts.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara objects again from the same clause of the mishna. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Meir are presented as disputing the case where the kohen holds a replacement. That frames their dispute around whether the kohen is treated as having acquired the animal, not around keeping the gifts from being forgotten. On that framing, Rav Pappa’s statement adds nothing.
Key Terms:
- וְהָקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא = but the latter clause teaches
- מְחַיֵּיב = obligates
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
The mishna frames it that way only to show the strength of Rabbi Yosei’s position
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: רַבִּי מֵאִיר אֲפִילּוּ סְפֵק מַעֲשֵׂר מְחַיַּיב, וְהָא דְּמִיפַּלְגִי בַּחֲלִיפִין — לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּפָטַר אֲפִילּוּ הֵיכָא דְּכֹהֵן בָּא עָלָיו מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains that Rav Pappa’s statement is necessary lest you say: Rabbi Meir deems one obligated to give the gifts even in the case of an animal whose status as tithe is uncertain, in order that the halakhic category of the gifts should not be forgotten. And as for the fact that the mishna presents their disagreement with regard to replacement animals, this serves to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who deems one exempt from the mitzva of the gifts even in a case where the priest comes upon the Israelite from two sides. Rav Pappa therefore teaches us that in fact Rabbi Meir exempts one from the mitzva of the priestly gifts in the case of an animal whose tithed status is uncertain.
קלאוד על הדף:
The framing does not prove Rabbi Meir’s reason. One could say that Rabbi Meir obligates even a doubtful tithe, and the mishna chose the replacement case only to display ‘the strength of Rabbi Yosei’. He exempts even where the kohen has a claim from two sides. So Rav Pappa’s statement is needed to establish that Rabbi Meir exempts the doubtful tithe. Each amora’s ‘all agree’ fixes one edge of the dispute.
Key Terms:
- לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ = to inform you of the strength [of his view]
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
If one twin died, why should Rabbi Tarfon split? Rabbi Ami: Rabbi Tarfon retracted
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶן, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: יַחְלוֹקוּ. אַמַּאי יַחְלוֹקוּ? נִיחְזֵי: אִי שָׁמֵן מִית — דְּכֹהֵן הוּא, וְהַאי דְּאִיכָּא דְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת; וְאִי כָּחוּשׁ מִית — דְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת מִית, וְהַאי דְּאִיכָּא דְּכֹהֵן הוּא! אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: חָזַר בּוֹ רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches: If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb. The Gemara asks: Why should they divide it? Let us see: According to Rabbi Tarfon, who holds that it is presumed that the healthier and better of the two emerged first, as explained earlier, if the fatter and better of the two died it should be assumed that it was the one that belonged to the priest, and this one that is left belongs to the owner. And if the leaner of the two died, it should be assumed that the animal of the owner died, and this one that is left belongs to the priest. Rabbi Ami said: In fact, Rabbi Tarfon retracted his previous ruling that the priest takes the better of the two, and instead ruled that the priest and owner divide the value of the offspring in all cases. The mishna was not emended to reflect the updated ruling.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Tarfon had said the better twin was born first. Then, if the fat one died, the kohen’s lamb died, and if the lean one died, the kohen’s lamb survived. Either way the answer is clear, and there is nothing to divide. Rabbi Ami answers that Rabbi Tarfon retracted his assumption about the better twin. He came to treat the order of birth as unknown and has the parties divide the value, and the mishna’s text was simply never revised.
Key Terms:
- חָזַר בּוֹ = he retracted
- שָׁמֵן = fat — the better animal
- כָּחוּשׁ = lean
- בַּעַל הַבַּיִת = the householder — here, the owner of the flock
- רַבִּי אַמֵּי = Rabbi Ami — amora of Eretz Yisrael, a student of Rabbi Yochanan
Segment 8
TYPE: משל
Rabbi Chiyya’s parable for Rabbi Tarfon: two sheep deposited with a shepherd
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה. אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא: מָשָׁל דְּרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה? לִשְׁנַיִם שֶׁהִפְקִידוּ אֵצֶל רוֹעֶה, שֶׁמַּנִּיחַ רוֹעֶה בֵּינֵיהֶם וּמִסְתַּלֵּק.
English Translation:
§ The mishna teaches: In a case where two animals were born together and one of them died, Rabbi Akiva says: The living offspring remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Rabbi Ḥiyya stated a parable that clarifies the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, who says that the priest and the owner divide the remaining lamb: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to two people who each deposited a sheep with a shepherd and one of the two sheep died, and it is unclear to whom it belonged. In that case, the shepherd places the remaining sheep between them and withdraws, leaving them to divide the value of the sheep between them. Likewise, the mishna is discussing a case where the live offspring is not in the possession of either the owner or the priest, and therefore it is divided between them.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Chiyya frames Rabbi Tarfon’s view with a parable. Two people each leave a sheep with a shepherd, and one sheep dies without anyone knowing whose it was. The shepherd sets the survivor down between them and withdraws, and they divide it. Neither claimant is in possession, so neither can tell the other to bring proof.
Key Terms:
- מָשָׁל = a parable
- שֶׁהִפְקִידוּ אֵצֶל רוֹעֶה = who deposited with a shepherd
- מַנִּיחַ בֵּינֵיהֶם וּמִסְתַּלֵּק = places it between them and withdraws
- רַבִּי חִיָּיא = Rabbi Chiyya — a tanna of the transitional generation, student of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and redactor of baraitot
Segment 9
TYPE: משל
The parable for Rabbi Akiva: one sheep deposited with a householder who has his own
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמָשָׁל דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה? לְאֶחָד שֶׁהִפְקִיד אֵצֶל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, שֶׁהַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.
English Translation:
And Rabbi Ḥiyya also stated a parable that clarifies the opinion of Rabbi Akiva: To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner, who had sheep of his own, and it is unknown whose sheep died. In that case, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. Since the remaining sheep is currently in the possession of the homeowner, the one who deposited the animal must prove that the living sheep belongs to him. Likewise, the mishna is discussing a case where the live offspring is in the possession of the owner, and therefore the burden of proof rests upon the priest.
קלאוד על הדף:
In Rabbi Akiva’s case, a person leaves a sheep with a householder who owns sheep of his own, and one dies. The householder is in possession of the survivor, so the depositor must prove that it is his. Rabbi Akiva’s owner is like that householder, and the kohen is the claimant.
Key Terms:
- שֶׁהִפְקִיד אֵצֶל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת = who deposited with a householder
- הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה = one who seeks to take from another bears the burden of proof
Segment 10
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Then what do they dispute? Rava (or Rav Pappa): everyone accepts both parables
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא בְּמַאי פְּלִיגִי? רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא פְּלִיג בִּשְׁנַיִם שֶׁהִפְקִידוּ אֵצֶל רוֹעֶה, שֶׁמַּנִּיחַ רוֹעֶה וּמִסְתַּלֵּק? וְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן פְּלִיג בְּאֶחָד שֶׁהִפְקִיד אֵצֶל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת? אָמַר רָבָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב פָּפָּא: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בִּשְׁנַיִם שֶׁהִפְקִידוּ אֵצֶל רוֹעֶה — שֶׁמַּנִּיחַ רוֹעֶה בֵּינֵיהֶם וּמִסְתַּלֵּק, וּבְאֶחָד שֶׁהִפְקִיד אֵצֶל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת — שֶׁהַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But if Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva are addressing different circumstances, then with regard to what matter do they disagree? Does Rabbi Akiva disagree with the conclusion in the parable mentioned with regard to Rabbi Tarfon’s opinion, of two people who each deposited a sheep with a shepherd, that the shepherd places the remaining sheep between them and withdraws? And similarly, does Rabbi Tarfon disagree with the conclusion in the case of one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner that the homeowner keeps the remaining sheep? Certainly not. Rather, Rava says, and some say it was Rav Pappa who says: Everyone concedes in the case of two who deposited sheep with a shepherd that the shepherd places it between them and withdraws, and everyone concedes in the case of one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.
קלאוד על הדף:
If the parables describe two different situations, Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva seem to be talking past each other, since neither would deny the other’s case. Rava, or some say Rav Pappa, confirms that both rulings are agreed. With the shepherd the parties divide, and with the householder the claimant must prove. The dispute must lie in a case between the two.
Key Terms:
- בְּמַאי פְּלִיגִי = about what do they disagree?
- וְאִיתֵּימָא = and some say — an alternative attribution
Segment 11
TYPE: תירוץ
They dispute a birth in the owner’s courtyard where the shepherd is a kohen: Rabbi Tarfon says he grants the kohen a share
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא בַּחֲצַר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וְרוֹעֶה כֹּהֵן. רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן סָבַר: אַקְנוֹיֵי קָא מַקְנֵי לֵיהּ בַּחֲצֵירוֹ, וְנִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּלִיתְעֲבִיד מִצְוָה בְּמָמוֹנֵיהּ, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ כִּשְׁנַיִם שֶׁהִפְקִידוּ אֵצֶל רוֹעֶה, שֶׁמַּנִּיחַ רוֹעֶה בֵּינֵיהֶן וּמִסְתַּלֵּק.
English Translation:
Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon disagree only where the offspring were born in the courtyard of the homeowner, and the shepherd is a priest to whom the homeowner usually gives his firstborn animals. Rabbi Tarfon holds: The homeowner transfers to the priest a portion of his courtyard so that the priest should acquire the firstborn offspring located there, because it is suitable for him that the mitzva of giving the firstborn to a priest should be performed. Therefore, the priest is considered to hold partial jurisdiction of the courtyard. And consequently, this is comparable to two people who each deposited a sheep with a shepherd and one of the two sheep died, where the shepherd places the remaining sheep between them and withdraws, leaving them to divide the value of the sheep between themselves.
קלאוד על הדף:
The real case is a birth in the owner’s own yard, with a kohen as his shepherd. Rabbi Tarfon holds that the owner is glad for the mitzva to be done with his property. He therefore grants the kohen a share of his courtyard so that the firstborn can be acquired there. With the courtyard effectively shared, the case becomes like the shepherd parable, and the survivor is divided.
Key Terms:
- חֲצַר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת = the householder’s courtyard
- אַקְנוֹיֵי קָא מַקְנֵי לֵיהּ = he transfers ownership to him
- נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּלִיתְעֲבִיד מִצְוָה בְּמָמוֹנֵיהּ = he is pleased that a mitzva be done with his property
- קִנְיַן חָצֵר = acquisition through one’s courtyard — a person’s property acquires objects within it
Segment 12
TYPE: תירוץ (המשך)
Rabbi Akiva: where he stands to lose, the owner grants nothing
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: כֵּיוָן דְּאִית לֵיהּ פְּסֵידָא — לָא מַקְנֵי לֵיהּ מִידַּעַם, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּאֶחָד שֶׁהִפְקִיד אֵצֶל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, שֶׁהַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.
English Translation:
And Rabbi Akiva holds: Since there is a loss to the owner in this case of uncertainty, he does not transfer anything to the priest. And as the courtyard belongs exclusively to the Israelite, this case is comparable to one who deposited a sheep with a homeowner who had sheep of his own, and it is unknown whose sheep died. The halakha in that case is that the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.
קלאוד על הדף:
Rabbi Akiva holds that goodwill toward a mitzva has limits. A share of the courtyard would cost the owner half a lamb, so we assume he did not grant one. The courtyard remains his alone, the case matches the householder parable, and the kohen must bring proof.
Key Terms:
- פְּסֵידָא = a loss
- לָא מַקְנֵי לֵיהּ מִידַּעַם = he does not transfer anything to him
Segment 13
TYPE: משנה
Mishna: two first-time ewes — two males both to the kohen; male and female, the male; two males and a female, one each
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מַתְנִי׳ שְׁתֵּי רְחֵילָיו שֶׁלֹּא בִּיכְּרוּ וְיָלְדוּ שְׁנֵי זְכָרִים — שְׁנֵיהֶם לַכֹּהֵן. זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה — הַזָּכָר לַכֹּהֵן. שְׁנֵי זְכָרִים וּנְקֵבָה — אֶחָד לוֹ וְאֶחָד לַכֹּהֵן. רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: הַכֹּהֵן בּוֹרֵר לוֹ אֶת הַיָּפֶה. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: מְשַׁמְּנִין בֵּינֵיהֶן, וְהַשֵּׁנִי יִרְעֶה עַד שֶׁיִּסְתָּאֵב.
English Translation:
MISHNA: If one’s two ewes had not previously given birth and they gave birth to two males, both of them are given to the priest, as each is its mother’s firstborn. If one gave birth to a male and the other to a female, the male is given to the priest, as it is its mother’s firstborn. If they gave birth to two males and a female, one of the males is kept by him and one is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them, and the priest takes the leaner of the two. And the second lamb must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point the owner may slaughter and eat it.
קלאוד על הדף:
The mishna now considers two ewes giving birth for the first time. Two males means each ewe bore one, and both go to the kohen. A male and a female means the male is certainly a firstborn. With two males and a female, one ewe bore a male alone, so at least one male is a firstborn. The second male might have come after a female, so only one goes to the kohen, and Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva dispute which one as before.
Key Terms:
- רְחֵילָיו = his ewes
- שֶׁלֹּא בִּיכְּרוּ = that had not yet given birth
- אֶחָד לוֹ וְאֶחָד לַכֹּהֵן = one for him and one for the kohen
Segment 14
TYPE: משנה (המשך)
Gifts, a death, and the combinations that give the kohen nothing
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְחַיָּיב בַּמַּתָּנוֹת, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי פּוֹטֵר. מֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶן, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: יַחְלוֹקוּ, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה. שְׁתֵּי נְקֵבוֹת וְזָכָר אוֹ שְׁנֵי זְכָרִים וּשְׁתֵּי נְקֵבוֹת — אֵין כָּאן לַכֹּהֵן כְּלוּם.
English Translation:
And when the owner slaughters the animal, he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, taken from it. Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt from giving the gifts. If one of the two born together died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the value of the remaining lamb. Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If they gave birth to two females and a male or to two males and two females, the priest has nothing here, as perhaps both ewes gave birth to females first.
קלאוד על הדף:
The earlier rulings repeat: the owner’s twin owes gifts according to the first tanna, and Rabbi Yosei exempts it. If one died, Rabbi Tarfon has them divide the survivor and Rabbi Akiva puts the burden of proof on the kohen. With two females and a male, or two males and two females, each ewe may have borne a female first, so the kohen receives nothing certain.
Key Terms:
- שְׁתֵּי נְקֵבוֹת וְזָכָר = two females and a male
- אֵין כָּאן לַכֹּהֵן כְּלוּם = the kohen has nothing here
Segment 15
TYPE: משנה
One ewe had given birth, one had not, and they bore two males: one each
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַחַת בִּיכְּרָה, וְאַחַת לֹא בִּיכְּרָה, וְיָלְדָה שְׁנֵי זְכָרִים, אֶחָד לוֹ וְאֶחָד לַכֹּהֵן. רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: הַכֹּהֵן בּוֹרֵר אֶת הַיָּפֶה. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: מְשַׁמְּנִין בֵּינֵיהֶן, וְהַשֵּׁנִי יִרְעֶה עַד שֶׁיִּסְתָּאֵב.
English Translation:
If one of his ewes had previously given birth and one had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males, one of the males is kept by him and one is given to the priest. Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest chooses the better of the two. Rabbi Akiva says: They assess the value of the lambs between them and the priest takes the leaner of the two. And the second lamb must graze until it becomes blemished, at which point he may slaughter and eat it.
קלאוד על הדף:
Only the ewe that has not given birth before can produce a firstborn. Of two males, exactly one is hers, but which one is unknown. So one goes to the kohen and one to the owner, with the same Tarfon and Akiva dispute over which lamb the kohen receives.
Key Terms:
- אַחַת בִּיכְּרָה = one had already given birth
- וְאַחַת לֹא בִּיכְּרָה = and one had not
Segment 16
TYPE: משנה (המשך)
Rabbi Yosei’s general rule stated, Rabbi Meir obligates; a male and a female give the kohen nothing
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְחַיָּיב בַּמַּתָּנוֹת. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי פּוֹטֵר, שֶׁרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁחֲלִיפָיו בְּיַד כֹּהֵן פָּטוּר מִן הַמַּתָּנוֹת. וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב. מֵת אֶחָד מֵהֶן, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: יַחְלוֹקוּ. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: הַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה. זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה — אֵין כָּאן לַכֹּהֵן כְּלוּם.
English Translation:
And when he slaughters the animal he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it. Rabbi Yosei deems him exempt him from giving those gifts, as Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to any animal whose replacements are in the possession of a priest, its owner is exempt from the mitzva of giving the priestly gifts. And Rabbi Meir deems him obligated to give the gifts. If one of the animals died, Rabbi Tarfon says: The priest and the owner divide the value of the remaining lamb. Rabbi Akiva says: Since there is uncertainty to whom it belongs, it remains in the possession of the owner, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. If a male and a female offspring were born together, everyone agrees that the priest has nothing here, as perhaps the one that had already given birth bore the male, and the one that had not given birth bore the female, in which case neither of the animals would have firstborn status.
קלאוד על הדף:
Here the mishna states Rabbi Yosei’s reason outright: anything whose replacement is in the kohen’s hand is exempt from the gifts. It also names the first tanna as Rabbi Meir. With a male and a female, the male may belong to the ewe that had already given birth, so nothing goes to the kohen. This is the clause the Gemara quoted on 18a-b.
Key Terms:
- שֶׁחֲלִיפָיו בְּיַד כֹּהֵן = whose replacements are in the kohen’s hand
- רַבִּי מֵאִיר = Rabbi Meir — a leading tanna, student of Rabbi Akiva
Segment 17
TYPE: צריכא
Why all three cases? Case one alone: Rabbi Akiva might hold his view only for twins from one womb
Hebrew/Aramaic:
גְּמָ׳ צְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן קַמַּיְיתָא, בְּהַהִיא קָאָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דִּתְרֵי מֵחֲדָא.
English Translation:
GEMARA: This mishna and the previous mishna (17a–b) listed three cases in which Rabbi Akiva rules that the priest receives the leaner of two potentially firstborn offspring, whereas Rabbi Tarfon maintains that he receives the better of the two. The Gemara notes: It was necessary to teach each of these three cases, as, had the mishna taught only the first case, that of a single ewe that gave birth to two male offspring, one might have thought that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion only in that case, as the two offspring came from one womb, and there is no reason to assume that the better offspring was born first.
קלאוד על הדף:
The Gemara explains why the mishnayot repeat the Tarfon and Akiva dispute in three settings. If we had only the single-ewe case of 17a, one could think Rabbi Akiva denies that the better twin came first only there. Both lambs came from one womb, and there is no basis for guessing which emerged first.
Key Terms:
- צְרִיכָא = it is necessary — each case teaches something the others do not
- אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן = had it taught us
- תְּרֵי מֵחֲדָא = two from one [mother]
Segment 18
TYPE: צריכא (המשך)
Case two: a lamb born alone might be the stronger, so Rabbi Akiva might concede
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲבָל רְחֵילָיו שֶׁלֹּא בִּיכְּרוּ, דִּתְרֵי מֵחֲדָא וְחַד מֵחֲדָא — אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, דְּהָךְ דִּילִידָא חַד שְׁבִיחַ טְפֵי.
English Translation:
But in the second case, that of his two ewes which had not previously given birth and which collectively gave birth to two males and a female, where two offspring came from one mother and one offspring came from one other mother, one might say that Rabbi Akiva concedes to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, as it can be claimed that the superior animal is this one that came from the mother that gave birth to a single offspring.
קלאוד על הדף:
In the two-ewe case, one ewe bore two lambs and the other bore one. A lamb that had its mother’s womb to itself is likely sturdier, and it is certainly a firstborn. So one might think Rabbi Akiva agrees there that the better lamb goes to the kohen. The mishna teaches that he does not.
Key Terms:
- חַד מֵחֲדָא = one from one [mother]
- שְׁבִיחַ טְפֵי = is superior
Segment 19
TYPE: צריכא (המשך)
Case three: had we only case two, perhaps Rabbi Akiva would concede where one ewe had already given birth — the daf breaks off (continues on 19a)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן הָא — בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ לֹא בִּיכְּרוּ, אֲבָל אַחַת בִּיכְּרָה וְאַחַת שֶׁלֹּא בִּיכְּרָה וְיָלְדוּ שְׁנֵי זְכָרִים — אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן,
English Translation:
And had the mishna taught only that second case, one might have thought that Rabbi Akiva stated his opinion only in that case, as both mothers had not previously given birth. But in a case where one had previously given birth and the other one had not previously given birth, and collectively they gave birth to two male offspring, one might say that Rabbi Akiva concedes to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon
קלאוד על הדף:
Had the mishna taught only the second case, one might think Rabbi Akiva’s view holds there because both ewes were first-time mothers. Where one ewe had already given birth and the other had not, one might say he concedes to Rabbi Tarfon. The reason for that possibility is given on 19a, where the sentence continues.
Key Terms:
- מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ = he concedes to him
- וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן הָא = and had it taught us this one